September 2013

The Foundation for Educational Choice has a new report today attempting to change the way we treat public pension plans. It essentially boils down to this: States themselves claim their pension funds covering teachers, principals, and other educators, are 78 percent funded, but the authors use different calculations based on what’s expected of private companies, derive another number and poof! the funding ratio drops to 60 percent. They then throw out the eye-boggling stat that states are actually $933 billion in the red due to unaccounted pension obligations.

Don’t believe it.

See, private pension funds are different than public ones, and they should be treated differently too. Private companies are required to contribute, on behalf of their defined benefit (DB) pension plans, to something called the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). The PBGC asks all employers with a DB plan to fully fund it so their future obligations are covered in case they ever go out of business or run out of money. When private employers fail to meet these obligations, they pay into the PBGC fund at higher levels. The PBGC can then compensate workers if their employer goes belly up. So when Enron, TransWorld Airlines (TWA), and Bethlehem Steel went bankrupt, their workers still earned some retirement benefits that had been promised them.

States, unlike private companies, do not fold under. Indiana, which according to the authors has a DB pension plan for teachers that is only 42% funded, is not likely to go out of business and take its workers down with it. The state of Indiana can assume a riskier investment return for its pension fund than an employer like those mentioned above or any other modern private firm (and, just for good measure, it’s worth pointing out that Indiana assumes only a 3 percent real rate of return).

All this is lost on the report’s authors, who would prefer states lower their assumptions on stock market returns from about 8 percent down to 6, the standard rate used by corporations in their calculations. This would mean telling a state like Pennsylvania, which has accumulated a 9.23 percent return in the stock market over the last 25 years (as ofFebruary 2010), that its 8 percent investment assumption is too high.

There are good reasons to consider changes in state pension plans, but this isn’t one of them. Expect more on this topic from Education Sector in the coming months.

Question: What do you get when you add a bad stock market + equally bad state budgets + generous pension benefits + an enhancement of those benefits + rising health costs + an aging workforce?

Answer: A large unfunded liability.

Example A is Pennsylvania, which recently announced they will be increasing the employer contribution rate for retired teacher pension and health benefits in 2010-11 by 72 percent over current levels. The projections into the future are even worse, as the Public School Employees’ Retirement System of Pennsylvania (PSERS) is currently predicting the rate to nearly triple in 2012-13.

The graph below shows a 60 year look, 30 years back and 30 years forward, at employee and employer contributions into PSERS. The blue line is the percentage of salary that the average employee contributes, and it has been pretty steady over time, although it has risen slightly. The red line is the combined contribution of school districts and the state (determined by formula, but the state contributes a little more than half), and it has fluctuated wildly. It was in double digits from 1973 to 1997, hit a low of 1.09 (1.09!!) in 2002, and is expected to reside above 30 percent from 2014 to 2020.

  • *indicates future projection

*indicates future projection

The projections already include an eight percent annual investment gain for the next 30 years, but even after that assumption added to the large employer contributions, the state will still have an unfunded liability of over $7 billion in 2039, in present dollars. To put that in perspective, the state and all its school districts contributed only $617 million last year.

The options to fix this situation are not very appealing, nor are they unique to Pennsylvania. State and local governments could, and probably will, raise taxes. That’s pretty much inevitable, but it’s also politically unpalatable. Because pension benefits are considered a legally binding contract, the state cannot reduce benefits to current employees. So, instead, they’re likely to address the political problem by taking what amounts to mild budgetary solutions and reducing benefits or changing the retirement structures for future employees and requiring higher employee contributions. PSERS could also seek to increase its investment performance (they’ve averaged a 9.25 percent return over the last 25 years), but to do so would require it to take on more risk.

The Wall Street Journal had an interesting article recently about pension spiking, a practice where workers use the calculation of their pension benefits to their advantage:

Pete Nowicki had been making $186,000 shortly before he retired in January as chief for a fire department shared by the municipalities of Orinda and Moraga in Northern California. Three days before Mr. Nowicki announced he was hanging up his hat, department trustees agreed to increase his salary largely by enabling him to sell unused vacation days and holidays. That helped boost his annual pension to $241,000.

This is entirely legal, but it amounts to real money spent on the part of state and municipal retirement systems:

Mr. Nowicki recently turned 51 years old. If he lives another 25 years, his pension payments will cost the fire district an estimated additional $1 million or more over what he would have received had he retired at a salary of $186,000, not including cost of living adjustments, a fire board representative said.

And, even though Mr. Nowicki is “retired,” he is still employed by the fire department as a consultant earning $176,000 a year.

Teachers are able to take advantage of these provisions as well, sometimes through informal ways like selling back vacation or sick days, and sometimes more subtly, through their district-negotiated contracts. In my recent study of large urban district salary schedules, I discovered an interesting example from the state of Florida. In Florida, teachers are awarded retirement benefits based on their salary over their last five years on the job. So, a district that opts to pay their teachers high salaries for these five years has to compensate them slightly higher for those five years only. But the state will be paying higher retirement benefits, based on these higher salaries, for the rest of that teacher’s life.

Broward County, Fla., for instance, gives teachers an average raise of only $320 in their first 10 years on the job, but back-loads $20,000 in raises into a short time period between year 18 and 21 on the job, packing almost 40 percent of all experience-based compensation into these three late-career years, a stage when teachers are unlikely to gain effectiveness in a commensurate way. This trend has accelerated over the last decade, as teachers crossing the threshold from 20 to 21 years of experience in Broward County have netted average raises of 16.1 percent, compared to 5.2 and 6.5 percent raises, respectively, for teachers crossing the 18- to 19-year and 19- to 20-year thresholds.

Teacher pension wealth grows slowly over time, only to spike dramatically at later ages.